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In a study issued June 23 by the Washington-based Institute for International Economics, author
William Cline outlines a "menu" of financing options that might stimulate additional commercial
bank lending for debtor nations. His major conclusions are that by year-end 1987 it is likely to be
clear that the Baker Plan is under way. The Baker debt plan "is not dead," and the debt crisis is not
becoming unmanageable. Cline points out that new commercial bank loans to debtors dropped
off substantially in 1985 and 1986. Some banks wanted out of the international lending business
while others were waiting for the debtor nations to make the necessary structural reforms to
their economies so that the banks could be assured of a realistic chance of repayment. However,
said Cline, without additional financing, structural reforms could only go so far. There was a
need for more flexible mechanisms for raising new money in support of the debt management
process. In brief, instead of simply extending new loans, it was up to the banks and the debtors
to look at a "menu" of other types of debt financing. The study proposes to tailor the financing
mechanism to the preferences of different classes of banks. For banks that believe a debtor country
can resolve its problems and will subsequently regain access to capital markets over the medium
term, Cline argues that the prime instrument for new money be bank purchases of bonds from
debtor nation governments, instead of the direct loans that have been the usual practice in recent
years. The author states that since bonds are usually not rescheduled and may be sold off in a
secondary market, this option should substantially increase the willingness of banks to participate
in new money packages for debtors. While this idea is not new, Cline argues for an extension of
the concept. The maturities of these bonds should probably be 10 years, a term that would be
sufficiently long to provide time for economic improvement but not so long as to be viewed as
near concessional. The debtor government would repay the bonds at maturity. In the event the
country's external position improves substantially during the term of the bond, the debtor would
have the option of borrowing from international credit markets to replace the bonds. In contrast,
if the debtor country's situation had not improved by the time the bonds mature, the banks acting
in coordination could commit themselves to purchase a new series of bonds on that date "thereby
rolling over (but not rescheduling) the principal." Other options discussed in the study follow: 1.
Interest capitalization. Instead of providing new loans, a bank could defer a portion of the scheduled
interest payments on existing loans until the end of the maturity period. 2. De minimus exemption.
Haggling among many banks involved in debt negotiations has resulted in considerable delays in
issuance of new financing. The de minimus rule would exempt from new money packages all banks
with the smallest absolute exposures aggregating to five percent. (For instance, of the 360 foreign
banks that hold claims on Argentina, only 130 could participate in new money packages if the rule
were applied. Some 300 of the 800 banks holding claims against Brazil would be exempted and
the number holding claims against Mexico would be cut in half.) 3. Convertible notes. In the case
of existing debt, some programs for converting the debt principal into equity exist in developing
countries. In the case of new money, one option would be to allow the banks to acquire equity
positions in the country's enterprises equal in value to their share of the new- money package.
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Because it takes time to develop equity projects, a variation on this approach would be for the bank
to purchase a dollar-denominated, interest-bearing note that would be convertible upon demand
into the country's domestic currency for immediate use to purchase equity investments. 4. Onlending. In the case of the 1986 debt refinancing package for Mexico, all of the new money was
earmarked for the central government. An option would permit the bank to channel some of the
new money to its private sector clients instead. The commercial risk would lie with the bank, not
with the government. 5. Contingency lending. New money could be linked to the achievement of
agreed growth targets, or to offset the adverse effects of a sharp decline in commodity prices. In each
country there may be banks that are unwilling to participate in new lending but whose exposure
is too large to qualify for exemption under the de minimum criterion. These are usually banks that
have been convinced that a debtor country will never be able to service its debt on a commercial
basis. Cline suggests a separate menu for these banks. This menu includes: a) Exit bonds. The bank
agreement with Argentina in April 1987 included a provision that any bank could convert up to $5
million dollars of its claims to 25-year bonds bearing a 4% interest rate with a grace period of several
years. An option here is that these bonds should be offered in much larger amounts per bank, up
to $50 million. b) Discounted debt-equity conversion. Instead of making a new loan, a bank would
convert its existing claim into equity on activities or projects approved by the debtor government
at a discount. c) Discounted loan repurchase. Banks that wished to exit might also offer to sell back
their loans to the debtor government at a discount.
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